Hawker Stall-Test Crashes: Urgent NTSB Action + NOTAM Slackline Tragedy
Max Trescott and Rob Mark connect a string of very different accidents with one shared theme: safety margin usually disappears one “reasonable” choice at a time—until the airplane (or the environment) collects the debt.
They open with a major development: the NTSB’s urgent recommendation to Textron after two fatal post-maintenance stall test flights in Hawker business jets. Max and Rob explain why stall testing in swept-wing jets can be uniquely unforgiving, and why “unacceptable stall characteristics” should make every pilot sit up straight. The takeaway: if a flight requires test-pilot skills, then “maintenance requires it” doesn’t make it safe—it demands the right training, the right crew, and the right conditions.
Max then shares NTSB news: a public board meeting on Tuesday, January 27, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. ET to determine probable cause for the January 29, 2025 midair collision over the Potomac River near Reagan National (PSA CRJ700 and an Army UH-60L Black Hawk). Max and Rob will be watching closely and will share clips in a future episode.
From there they break down recent accidents and reports, including: the Dassault Falcon 50, 9H-DFS, crash near Haymana, Turkey; an MD530F helicopter, N3502P, near Superior, Arizona where a slackline/highline may have been a factor; a TBM 700, N700PT, near Monroe, Wisconsin involving an approach continued below minimums; the Hawker 900XP, N900VA, fatal post-maintenance stall test crash; a Cessna P210, N1400, fuel exhaustion accident in San Diego in IMC with low recent flying; and a Bonanza G36, N360FV, near Tracy, California that illustrates the engine-emergency dilemma: choose the ugly, certain option—or gamble for the “better” airport you might not reach.
Max talks with Rob Mark about how several very different accidents share the same root problem: pilots (and operators) slowly trade away margin until the day the airplane—or the environment—collects the debt. This episode isn’t a written accident report; it’s the context, the decision traps, and the safety lessons you can apply the next time the plan starts to unravel.
The episode opens with a major safety development: the NTSB’s urgent recommendation to Textron after two fatal post-maintenance stall test flights in Hawker business jets. Max and Rob dig into why stall testing in swept-wing jets can be uniquely unforgiving and why “unacceptable stall characteristics” is a phrase every pilot should take seriously. Their takeaway is blunt: if a flight requires test-pilot skills, then “maintenance requires it” doesn’t make it safe. It means the training, crew qualification, and conditions have to be absolutely right—or the smartest choice is to delay and use specialists who routinely fly those profiles.
Right after that urgent recommendation discussion, Max reads an NTSB press release announcing a public board meeting on Tuesday, January 27, 2026 at 9:00 a.m. ET to determine probable cause for the January 29, 2025 midair collision over the Potomac River near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport involving a PSA Airlines CRJ700 regional jetliner and a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter. The board will discuss safety issues and vote on probable cause findings and safety recommendations designed to prevent similar crashes. Max and Rob note they’ll be watching the meeting closely, expecting much of it to echo testimony from the prior three-day hearing they covered in episodes 7–9, but listening for anything new—and they plan to bring audio clips from the board meeting into a future episode. If you want to watch the live video feed, look for the link in the show notes for this episode.
The show then moves into recent accidents, starting overseas with a reminder that “business aviation” can still turn lethal when planning, execution, and operational risk intersect. Rob covers the crash of a Dassault Falcon 50, 9H-DFS, on December 23, 2025, about 2 km from Haymana, Turkey, with 8 fatalities. They discuss how high-level missions and VIP transport can create subtle pressure—schedule pressure, mission pressure, and the normalization of “we do this all the time.” The point isn’t to speculate beyond what’s known; it’s to underline how quickly a professional operation can still end in a crater when risk stacking goes unchecked.
Next, Max covers an accident that hits close to home for helicopter pilots operating in rugged terrain: an MD530F helicopter, N3502P, that crashed on January 2, 2026, near Superior, Arizona, with 4 fatalities. The suspected factor discussed is a slackline/highline stretched across a canyon area—an obstacle that can be nearly invisible from the air until it’s too late. The core lesson is practical: wires, lines, and temporary obstacles are where helicopters live, and even when there’s some form of notice, the way information is surfaced can fail pilots. If hazards like this exist, the system has to make them hard to miss—and pilots need briefing habits that capture route and area threats, not just what’s at a destination airport.
In preliminary reports, Max discusses a Socata TBM 700, N700PT, that crashed on November 24, 2025, near Monroe, Wisconsin, with 2 fatalities. Max says this one made him sick to read because the pilot and passenger had checked out in the airplane only 19 days earlier. The accident sequence centers on an approach continued below published minimums. Their discussion isn’t about “gotchas” or legalisms—it’s about decision hygiene. When the weather is clearly below minimums, “taking a look” often becomes a way to postpone the divert decision until workload is highest, stress is highest, and the airplane gives you the fewest options. They emphasize that missed approaches and transitions back to instruments are common points where control and situational awareness slip—especially when a pilot is relatively new to a high-performance airplane.
The episode then turns to final reports, starting with a headline-level lesson about post-maintenance flight risk. They cover the Hawker 900XP, N900VA, crash on February 7, 2024, involving two fatalities. Max and Rob connect it directly to the earlier urgent recommendation: when post-maintenance stall tests become a requirement, the operation needs specific training standards, a conservative test plan, and conditions that don’t add risk (like possible icing or contamination). Their takeaway is that “the airplane passed last week” is meaningless if today’s crew, today’s conditions, or today’s setup are different. Post-maintenance flights deserve elevated scrutiny because small maintenance or configuration issues can become catastrophic when combined with edge-of-envelope maneuvers.
Max also covers a fuel-exhaustion accident that is painfully common in pattern but still shocking in outcome: a Cessna P210, N1400, that crashed in San Diego, California, on November 15, 2023, with one fatality. The show’s takeaway is direct: running out of gas in IMC is a self-constructed emergency, and it often rides alongside proficiency gaps. In this case, Max notes the pilot had only about seven hours total flight time in the past year and was not instrument current. They stress that total time doesn’t save you if recent time and proficiency don’t match the mission. Fuel planning failures are usually optimism failures: expecting the weather to cooperate, expecting the approach to work, expecting delays to be short, and expecting alternates to stay open.
Finally, Max discusses a classic decision trap triggered by an engine problem after maintenance: a Beechcraft Bonanza G36, N360FV, that had an accident on December 15, 2025, near Tracy, California, resulting in minor injuries. The scenario forces the hardest real-time choice pilots face: do you commit early to the closest survivable option—even if it’s ugly—or gamble for a better airport that you might not reach? The show’s message is clear: in emergencies, certainty beats comfort. You don’t win by finding the prettiest outcome; you win by removing uncertainty before the airplane removes it for you.
Across these accidents—Falcon 50 9H-DFS near Haymana, MD530F N3502P near Superior, TBM 700 N700PT near Monroe, Hawker 900XP N900VA, Cessna 210 N1400 in San Diego, and Bonanza G36 N360FV near Tracy—the theme is consistent: your safety margin is usually decided before the emergency starts—by training, briefing discipline, and whether you choose conservative certainty when it matters.