Reagan National Midair NTSB Hearing Day 2: Army Black Hawk & CRJ-700 Testimony
Max Trescott plays audio clips from Day 2 of the NTSB investigative hearing on the midair collision near Washington’s Reagan National Airport between a PSA Airlines CRJ-700 and a U.S. Army UH-60L Black Hawk. This day focused exclusively on Panel 3: Training, Guidance, and Procedures Applicable to DCA Air Traffic Control, revealing systemic issues that shaped the events leading to the accident.
A major theme was visual separation. Testimony explored the difference between pilot-applied and tower-applied visual separation in Class B airspace and the operational norm at DCA where helicopter pilots almost reflexively request pilot-applied visual separation. Experts explained how the unique combination of restricted airspace, helicopter routes, and runway configurations makes visual separation “paramount” for traffic flow, though it shifts collision avoidance responsibility to pilots. A U.S. Army pilot described the difficulty of spotting Runway 33 arrivals at low altitude, highlighting how these challenges contributed to the accident sequence.
Staffing emerged as a critical factor. The DCA tower had 19 fully operational controllers to cover 16 shifts a day, forcing position combinations such as merging tower and helicopter frequencies. Witnesses described high workload and a culture summed up by the phrase “just make it work,” raising questions about whether safety margins were being eroded. A management-level request to reduce arrival rates from 32 to 28 per hour due to safety concerns was denied, reportedly over political timing related to FAA reauthorization.
The hearing also examined miles-in-trail spacing, revealing inconsistent agreements between Potomac TRACON and DCA Tower and noting that arrivals were being fed at less than four miles apart before the accident. Conflict alert systems were scrutinized, with testimony that up to 50% of alerts are “nuisance alerts,” that could lead to controller desensitization. The Black Hawk’s lack of ADS-B Out was discussed, though radar coverage mitigated its effect on conflict alerting in this case.
Additional revelations included confusion over helicopter route altitudes, the tower’s downgrade from Level 10 to Level 9 (which resulted in new controllers being paid at a lower level than existing controllers), and an external compliance audit that found 33 areas of non-compliance—so severe the audit was halted and converted into an internal corrective action. The episode also covers the failure to conduct alcohol testing at all of controllers after the accident, contrary to the DOT’s two-hour requirement.
Max weaves over an hour of testimony into a narrative that exposes the intersection of human factors, training gaps, and systemic pressures inside one of the nation’s most complex airspace environments. The episode underscores how a combination of cultural norms, operational constraints, and safety oversight gaps set the stage for this tragic collision—and what must change to prevent future accidents.